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INTRODUCTION
“The idea that the protection of human rights knows no
international boundaries and that the international community
has an obligation to ensure that governments guarantee and
∗
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protect human rights has gradually captured the imagination
of mankind.”1
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”)2 is the
founding document of the law of human rights. But in addition to its
role as the progenitor of an ever-increasing body of conventionbased human rights law, the normative impact of the UDHR can be
felt in the activist efforts of individuals and groups who protest
violations of, and ensure respect for, the human rights of people
whom they have never met. Despite the fact that the body of human
rights law stemming from the UDHR only enshrines obligations
upon states and organizations made up of states, the UDHR’s
powerful moral focus has fostered the development of a
contemporary “individual responsibility to protect” norm.
The UDHR’s moral, rather than legal, focus arose both out of the
desire to respond forcefully to the evils perpetrated by Nazi
Germany3 and the reluctance on the part of powerful states to take on
legal obligations that would impinge upon their sovereignty.
Consequently, while the UDHR represents a profound statement of
global unanimity on the moral rights of individuals, its drafting
history reveals a clear intent not to impose corresponding legal duties
upon states.4 Although the UDHR was intended as an immediate
precursor to an international bill of rights that would impose binding
legal obligations upon states, nearly three decades passed before
those obligations entered into force.5 In the intervening twenty-eight
years, the global public’s growing awareness of the concept of

1. Thomas Buergenthal, The Normative and Institutional Evolution of
International Human Rights, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 703, 704 (1997).
2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
3. See JAMES AVERY JOYCE, THE NEW POLITICS OF RIGHTS 45 (St. Martin’s
Press 1978) (“The Universal Declaration was humanity’s unanimous response to
the Nazi death camps, the fleeing refugees, and the tortured prisoners of war.”).
4. See Hersch Lauterpacht, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 25
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 354, 356 (1948) (remarking that the drafters were relatively
undisturbed by the idea of a acknowledging universal human rights without also
providing a binding legal framework for the enforcement of those rights).
5. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Jan. 3,
1976, 933 U.N.T.S. 3; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 99 U.N.T.S. 171.
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universal human rights was based upon the moral imperatives
expressed by the UDHR.
This moral inflection to our understanding of human rights has
persisted despite the creation of an extensive legal regime dedicated
to promoting and protecting human rights. One of the most effective
methods for encouraging state compliance with the dictates of human
rights law has been the practice of focusing moral opprobrium upon
violators, popularly known as “naming and shaming.”6 Cynics might
suggest that this use of moral sanction has arisen solely because of
imperfect legal enforcement. It is certainly true that states have little
incentive to police one another’s compliance with the legal regime
given that violations pose no obvious detriment to the potentially
enforcing states. However, the power and efficacy of “naming and
shaming” suggest that its persistent use must stem from more than
just the inadequacy of legal enforcement: it is derived from the
UDHR’s encapsulation of the idea that human rights are
accompanied by moral obligations.7
This idea that the international community has moral obligations
to individuals has recently been the subject of discussion in the
debate over the emerging Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”) norm.
R2P is an effort at providing new moral guidelines to humanitarian
intervention that recharacterizes sovereignty as responsibility.8 States
have an obligation to protect their citizens from humanitarian
disaster, and when they fail, that obligation falls upon the
international community.

6. See discussion infra, § II.b.
7. See UDHR, supra note 2, paras. 6, 8 (recognizing that U.N. member states
have pledged to respect, observe, and protect human rights and proclaiming that
every nation should strive to secure the human rights standards detailed in the
UDHR).
8. See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, §§ 2.14-2.15 (Dec.
2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT] (challenging U.N. Charter signatories to
recognize sovereignty not as control but as both an internal and external
responsibility to protect, including 1) the responsibility of state authorities to the
citizens, 2) the responsibility of national political authorities to citizens and to the
global community, and 3) accountability on the part of state actors for their
actions).
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In addition to laying the groundwork for the emerging R2P norm,
the UDHR has also fostered the idea that it is incumbent upon the
individual, as a member of the global community, to promote and
protect human rights.9 This conviction can be seen in the literature of
current campaigns to end genocide that implicitly base their calls for
individual participation on a moral obligation grounded in human
rights.10 In this way, the UDHR’s normative impact as the moral
compact of the global community continues to grow.

I. THE UDHR’S MORAL FOCUS
Mary Robinson, the former U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights, has described the UDHR as “one of the great aspirational
documents of our human history.”11 The document arose out of the
international community’s horror-stricken desire to send a firm
message of “never again” regarding the atrocities of the Holocaust.12
However, the UDHR itself reflects the realities of compromise
between the new commitment to human rights and resistance to
relinquishing state sovereignty.13
Although the UDHR represents a “ringing declaration that all
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,”14 its
drafters were careful to ensure that its provisions would have no
binding legal effect.15 The mandate to impose legal obligations upon
9. UDHR, supra note 2, pmbl. para. 8.
10. See, e.g., infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text (examining techniques
used to call individuals to action to respond to the current situation in The Sudan).
11. Mary Robinson, UN High Comm’r for Human Rights, Romanes Lecture at
Oxford University: Realizing Human Rights: “Take Hold of it Boldly and Duly . .
.” (Nov. 11, 1997), http://www.un.org/rights/50/dpi1938.htm.
12. See Johannes Morsink, World War Two and the Universal Declaration, 15
HUMAN RTS. Q. 357, 357-58 (1993) (explaining that the drafters intended the
UDHR not only as a response to the Second World War, but also as a way to
enshrine universal human rights in a way that would outlast the memories of the
War).
13. See Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at 356 (“The practical unanimity of the
Members of the United Nations in stressing the importance of the [UDHR] was
accompanied by an equally general repudiation of the idea that the [UDHR]
imposed upon them a legal obligation to respect the human rights and fundamental
freedoms which it proclaimed.”).
14. Oscar Schachter, The Genesis of the Declaration: A Fresh Examination, 11
PACE INT’L L. REV. 27, 57 (1999).
15. See Tai-Heng Cheng, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Sixty:
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states was reserved for the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), which followed
twenty-eight years later.

A. THE CALL FOR A HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENT
With the world still reeling from the horrors of the Holocaust, the
international community struggled to reconstitute itself in the
aftermath of World War II. The League of Nations’s failure to
prevent the war made it clear that a new international organization
was needed to promote international peace and security.16 Although
the term “United Nations” initially referred to those nations united in
war against the Axis powers,17 the Allies quickly began to use it in
their discussions of a successor organization to the League of
Nations.
Nazi Germany’s persecution of Jews and other minorities had
made it apparent that a government’s abuse of its citizens could no
longer be considered a matter of purely domestic concern,18 and in
the early 1940s global public opinion militated strongly for “some
sort of human rights plank in the eventual peace treaties.”19 The
drafters of the U.N. Charter agreed that providing for human rights
should be one of the primary aims of the new global organization,
committing the newly formed United Nations to work to “achieve
international co-operation in solving international problems of an

Is It Still Right for the United States? 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251, 262 (2008)
(observing that contemporaneous records of the drafting committee’s discussions
emphasized the committee’s determination that the power of the UDHR would lie
in its moral correctness rather than the imposition of legally binding obligations).
16. See Buergenthal, supra note 1, at 706 (discussing the theory that Hitler’s
rise to power may have been prevented if there had been a stronger international
organization than the League of Nations in existence).
17. United Nations, Joint Declaration of the United Nations on the Cooperative
War Effort of the Democracies (Jan. 2, 1942), in DEP’T ST. BULL., Jan. 3, 1942, at
3 (welcoming other nations to be part of a Joint Declaration by the United Nations
if those other nations also opposed Hitler).
18. See Morsink, supra note 12, at 358 (“The horrors of the Holocaust shocked
the delegates and the countries they represented into a reaffirmation and reiteration
of the existence of human rights.”)
19. JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT 1 (Univ. of Pa. Press 1999).
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economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion.”20 In line with this goal, Article 55 of the
Charter states that “the United Nations shall promote . . . universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.”21
Despite proposals to define these “human rights and fundamental
freedoms,” the Charter did not itself enumerate them.22 That task was
given to the newly established Commission on Human Rights (“the
Commission”). The Commission was asked to prepare an
international bill of rights which would “serve as a common standard
of achievement for all peoples of all nations.”23

B. THE DRAFTING OF THE UDHR
The Commission on Human Rights, chaired by U.S. representative
Eleanor Roosevelt, met for the first time in early 1947. It comprised
eighteen members, with five representing the great powers, and
thirteen representing the rotating members.24 In response to the call
for an international bill of rights the commission decided that it
would produce three instruments: first, “a non-binding declaration to
be adopted by the General Assembly under its recommendatory
authority,” second, a bill of rights, and third, a “Methods of
Implementation” document.25 The French representative, René

20. U.N. Charter art.1, para. 3.
21. U.N. Charter art. 55(c).
22. See Schachter, supra note 14, at 53 (explaining how the major powers
preferred including human rights as a purpose or objective within the Charter
without enumerating rights within the Charter or forming a separate treaty, as
suggested by the Latin American group).
23. See Eleanor Roosevelt, U.S. Representative to the General Assembly,
Statement during the General Assembly’s Adoption of the UDHR (Dec. 9, 1948),
in DEP’T ST. BULL., Dec. 19, 1948, at 751 (emphasizing that the UDHR is not
intended to be a treaty or an international agreement but a set of broad principles of
rights and freedoms).
24. See MORSINK, supra note 19, at 4.
25. Schachter, supra note 14, at 55.
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Cassin, was primarily responsible for the drafting process of the
UDHR; he later received a Nobel Peace Prize for his work.26
Cassin’s draft was grounded in natural law principles27 and
visualized the structure of human rights as a temple founded on four
pillars: civil, social, political, and economic rights.28 While
considering the UDHR, some representatives of the Economic and
Social Committee (“ECOSOC”) expressed concern about the lack of
enforcement provisions.29 However, the ECOSOC unanimously
agreed to forward the draft to the U.N. General Assembly.30
The draft UDHR was next taken up by the Third Committee of the
General Assembly, where things did not go as smoothly.31 Cold War
tensions had “reached a new level of intensity”32 and the Soviet
Union insisted that the Third Committee reproduce the work of the
commission and “debate and vote on the whole Declaration, article
by article and line by line.”33 Eventually, after over two months of
debates, and owing in large part to the diplomatic efforts of Eleanor
Roosevelt and Charles Malik of Lebanon, the UDHR was forwarded
to the General Assembly where it was adopted on December 10,
26. See Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153, 1158 (1998) (highlighting Cassin’s career
as a preeminent comparative lawyer who was previously employed as Charles de
Gaulle’s principal legal advisor in World War II and was responsible for
rehabilitating the French administrative system after the war).
27. See Schachter, supra note 14, at 55-6 (“[I]t is pretty clear that the
philosophic perspective of the drafting bodies was in the natural law orientation.
Nobody even suggested that the [UDHR] or the other instruments should be based
on existing positive law.”).
28. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION 162
(Richard Pierre Claude et al. eds., Univ. of Pa. Press 3d ed. 2006) (describing
Cassin’s fifth aspect of his natural law formulation as the “pediment of the [human
rights] temple,” which symbolized the harmonization of human rights provisions
and governments’ support of human rights).
29. See Cheng, supra note 15, at 265 (noting comments by the Dutch, New
Zealand, Denmark and Soviet delegates that the UDHR would be “meaningless” if
it lacked an enforcement mechanism).
30. See Glendon, supra note 26, at 1160.
31. See id. (quoting Eleanor Roosevelt’s statement that “[w]e thought we were
presenting such a good draft that there would be very little discussion. We found
we were mistaken. In the big committee they argued every word . . . . And so we
had some terrible times in Paris.”).
32. Richard N. Gardner, The Genesis of the Declaration: A Fresh Examination,
11 PACE INT’L L. REV. 27, 39 (1999).
33. Id.
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1948 by a vote of forty-eight in favor, none opposing, and eight
abstaining.34

C. THE NORMATIVE IMPACT OF THE UDHR
The newly-adopted UDHR was viewed by its framers as “a first
step in a great evolutionary process.”35 The delegates agreed that it
would have no binding authority over states, but they hoped that it
“would define the human rights which states undertook to recognize
and would serve as a criterion to guide and stimulate them.”36 The
United States, in particular, was adamant that the UDHR “was not a
legal document and possessed no legally binding force,”37 but was
instead “a declaration of basic principles of human rights and
freedoms.”38
In introducing the document, the President of the General
Assembly pointed out that, although the UDHR neither effectuates
human rights nor contains provisions for their enforcement, its
impact would still be profound because:
It is the first occasion on which the organized community of
nations has made a declaration on human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and it has the authority of the body of
the United Nations as a whole, and millions of people, men,
women, and children all over the world, many miles from
Paris and New York, will turn for help, guidance and
inspiration to this document.39

34. See Glendon, supra note 26, at 1162 (noting that the General Assembly
gave Charles Malik of Lebanon and Eleanor Roosevelt a standing ovation); see
also Gardner, supra note 32, at 39 (noting that the UDHR passed at 3:00 a.m. and
that “the Soviet Union and its satellites, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa” abstained
from the vote).
35. See Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at 354 (quoting the Verbatim Record of the
General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 3d sess., 183d plen. mtg. at 166, U.N. Doc. A/PV
(Dec. 10, 1948)).
36. See Cheng, supra note 15, at 266 (quoting the Mexican Representative).
37. Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at 357.
38. Roosevelt, supra note 23, at 751.
39. See Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at 354 (quoting the Verbatim Record of the
General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 3d sess., 183d plen. mtg. at 166, U.N. Doc. A/PV
(Dec. 10, 1948)).
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Other delegates echoed this conviction of the UDHR’s moral
power throughout the drafting procedure. The Belgian representative
described the UDHR as having “a moral value and authority which is
without precedent in the history of the world.”40 He continued:
There will be, therefore, very great moral prestige and moral
authority attaching to this [d]eclaration. Therefore the man in
the street claiming certain rights would not simply be an
isolated voice crying in the wilderness; it will be a voice
upheld by all the peoples of the world represented at this
Assembly.41
The drafters were explicit that the moral authority of the UDHR
was not diminished by its lack of provision for legal enforcement. As
the representative of the United Kingdom explained during the Third
Committee debates, the UDHR had “great moral authority, through
the proclamation of an ideal, even though it could not impose
specific obligations.”42 In the words of Professor Hersch Lauterpacht,
who felt strongly that the document’s authority was called into
question by its lack of legal status, the drafters maintained that:
[A]ny . . . inconsistency between the fact of the general
agreement as to what are fundamental human rights and the
refusal to recognize them as juridically binding in the sphere
of conduct was fully resolved by the acknowledgment of their
validity in the realm of conscience and ethics.43
Consequently, the incipient human rights regime was founded on a
profound statement of the moral will of the international community
whose passage “was dependent upon rejection of its bindingness
upon sovereign states.”44 The UDHR’s intentionally limited legal
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 355.
Id.
Id. at 359-60 (quoting A/C.3/SR.89, p.2).
Id. at 357.
Kenneth Henley, Human Rights and the Rule of Law, in UNIVERSAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: MORAL ORDER IN A DIVIDED WORLD 174 (David A. Ready et al.
eds., Roman & Littlefield 2005) (explaining how the lack of legally binding
authority in the UDHR exacerbated the “puzzle of vindication” which he identifies
as both the absence of “practical reality to supposed human rights” and the absence
of “any consensus about which rights should be universal and who possesses
them”).
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impact would have lasting results upon the development and
character of the international human rights regime.

II. HUMAN RIGHTS AS A MORAL ENTERPRISE
Although the adoption of the UDHR generated pro-human rights
momentum, as a result of Cold War political tensions the drafting of
the two conventions making up the International Bill of Rights was
not complete until the late 1960s.45 Even after the ICCPR and the
ICESCR entered into legal force in 1976, policing compliance with
human rights law remained heavily morally inflected. As such,
NGOs developed the practice of “naming and shaming” governments
into remedying human rights violations.46
Despite the absence of perfect legal enforcement of human rights
law, “[s]lowly, imperceptibly, how any state treated any human
being became, in principle and to some extent in fact, ‘of
international concern,’ everybody’s business.”47 In this way, the
UDHR fostered the belief that not only is compliance with human
rights norms a moral duty on the part of states; the entire
international community is morally obligated not to stand by in the
face of a government’s abuse of its citizens.

A. THE DELAY IN ACHIEVING AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS
The adoption of the UDHR proved to be a high water mark for
global consensus on the substance of human rights. Progress on the
International Bill of Rights was quickly stymied by Cold War
ideological divisions.48 In 1952, the General Assembly agreed to split

45. See Glendon, supra note 26, at 1173 (noting the disappointment of the
UDHR’s framers at the “scandalous politicization of U.N. agencies” that stalled
the implementation of human rights projects under the UDHR).
46. See Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Practical Issues Faced by an International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM.
RTS. Q. 63, 67 (2004) (noting that “the core of [NGOs’] methodology is [their]
ability to investigate, expose, and shame”).
47. Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”, 25 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 31, 34 (1995) [hereinafter Henkin, Human Rights].
48. See Leslie Armour, Economic Rights and Philosophical Anthropology, in
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
41 (William Sweet ed., Univ. of Ottawa Press 2003) (remarking that at the time
that the UDHR was adopted, human rights were divided into “traditional personal
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the project into two separate conventions,49 with the ICCPR
representing the liberal democratic focus on individual rights, and the
ICESCR representing the Eastern Bloc’s focus on collective rights.50
The drafts of these documents were presented to the General
Assembly in 1954, but were not adopted until December 16, 1966.51
They came into force ten years later following ratification by thirtyfive parties.52 These two conventions were “only the inaugural salvo
of what would become a streak of successive international treaties
that sought to entrench minimal guarantees for human rights
protections.”53 States have subsequently widely acceded to a number
of international covenants that create domestic legal obligations visà-vis their citizens.54
rights and liberties” on one hand, and “economic rights” on the other).
49. See JOYCE, supra note 3, at 59 (concluding that the two Covenants are
effectively part of one piece used to implement the Charter as the General
Assembly simultaneously adopted both in 1966, and further noting that a number
of members of the Human Rights Commission asserted that it would be not only
impossible but also meaningless to recognize the rights enumerated in one
Covenant without also recognizing the rights enumerated in the other).
50. See Armour, supra note 48, at 41 (differentiating between the West and the
Eastern Bloc by explaining the expansiveness of freedom of speech and religion
and political freedoms in the West versus the low unemployment rates, universal
healthcare, and general accessibility of free education in Eastern Bloc nations).
51. G.A. Res. 2200, at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
52. See JOYCE, supra note 3, at 46; see also Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/ratification (follow “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (listing the current 164 parties to the
ICCPR); id. (follow “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights” hyperlink) (listing the current 160 parties to the ICESCR).
53. Robert Charles Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs? Human Rights
Nongovermental Organizations and the Case for Regulation, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 261, 268 (2004).
54. Louis Henkin, Lecture, That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization,
and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) [hereinafter
Henkin, Lecture] (observing that states have chosen to adopt international
covenants despite their reluctance to relinquish their sovereignty); see also Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations,
supra note 52 (listing the current states that are party to the human rights
conventions as follows: 140 states are currently parties to the Genocide
Convention; 193 to the Convention on the Rights of the Child; 146 to the
Convention Against Torture; 173 to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination; and 185 to the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women).
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Although the adoption of the ICCPR and ICESCR signified a
“seismic shift” that “mov[ed] the notion of human rights from one of
vague moral principles to legally binding norms,”55 it did not draw
global attention the way the proclamation of the UDHR had.56
Although the new legal obligations provided a welcome tool for
promoting respect for human rights by states, their late arrival on the
scene meant that they were incorporated into a pre-existing system of
policing compliance, one based upon the moral imperatives of the
UDHR. In the absence of binding international law, the UDHR alone
had provided only “the blueprint that would serve to guide virtually
all human rights developments from 1948 forward.”57 This resulted
in an entrenched reliance on tools for encouraging compliance that
were dependent on moral rhetoric arising out of the UDHR’s
resounding call to responsibility.

B. “NAMING AND SHAMING”
Describing the international human rights regime in 1998, Louis
Henkin said: “[s]tates can be shamed, and the system resorts
increasingly to mobilizing shame.”58 This mobilization of shame has
been a primary focus of the work of human rights NGOs.59
Organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
report abuses of human rights in order to expose violators to moral
opprobrium.60

55. Blitt, supra note 53, at 268.
56. JOYCE, supra note 3, at 46 (attributing the scant attention paid to the two
covenants to a general apathy with which the world regarded human rights absent a
“blatant violation of human rights”).
57. Blitt, supra note 53, at 267.
58. Henkin, Human Rights, supra note 47, at 44.
59. See Leonard Rubenstein, Response by Leonard S. Rubenstein, 26 HUM.
RTS. Q. 879, 881 (2004) (characterizing part of the “urgent business” of NGOs as
informing public opinion and impacting the ways in which political leaders
respond to human rights violations).
60. See Sandeep Gopalan, Alternative Sanctions and Social Norms in
International Law: The Case of Abu Ghraib, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 785, 820
(2007) (explaining that Amnesty International employs advertisements, print
media, and the Internet as major tools in its shaming practices); see also id. at 829
(using the Human Rights Watch’s 2005 report, which highlighted the U.S.
government’s use of torture at Abu Ghraib, as an example of the type of moral
rhetoric that NGOs call on when disseminating information to the public in order
to influence public opinion with respect to a human rights violation).
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William Schultz, the executive director of Amnesty International,
identifies the goal of these efforts: “The eyes of the world [will
shine] on the prisons and into the dark corners of police stations and
military barracks all over the world to try to bring international
pressure to bear upon governments which are committing human
rights violations.”61 Similarly, Kenneth Roth, the executive director
of Human Rights Watch, argues that organizations like Human
Rights Watch have an impact because they use their resources to
hold officials accountable for their actions by exposing those actions
to the public and “generat[ing] public outrage.”62
The UDHR has provided a “point of departure for the concern and
activism of [NGOs].”63 These organizations have used the UDHR’s
definition of human rights, and have identified actions that do not
adhere to the UDHR as actions meriting a targeted response.64 The
use of targeted moral outrage and the mobilization of shame to police
compliance with human rights obligations is not limited to NGOs.
For example, naming and shaming has become widely used by
domestic human rights organizations.65

C. THE VALUE OF THE MORAL FOCUS
Critics of the international human rights regime “scoff at the
primitive character of ‘human rights enforcement,’”66 and suggest
61. Bill Steigerwald, Human Rights and Wrongs, PITTSBURG TRIB. REV., Mar.
29, 2003, available at http://pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/opinion/columnists
/steigerwald-/s_126235.html.
62. Roth, supra note 46, at 67.
63. WILLIAM KOREY, NGOS AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: “A CURIOUS GRAPEVINE” 44 (St. Martin’s Press 1998) (emphasizing that
the UDHR could be used to criticize governments for failing to comply with
international obligations).
64. See Gopalan, supra note 60, at 882 (referring in particular to Amnesty
International, and comparing its function to that of a prosecutor).
65. Leonard S. Rubenstein, How International Human Rights Organizations
Can Advance Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Response to Kenneth Roth,
26 HUM. RTS. Q. 845, 848 (2004) (“Indeed, naming and shaming has become so
universal a methodology that it is a staple not only of international human rights
organizations but also of national and community-based human rights groups, UN
agencies and rapporteurs, and even government-sponsored human rights reports.”)
66. Henkin, Human Rights, supra note 47, at 41 (referencing the weak nature
of enforcement resulting from the special character of international human rights
law and human rights victims, which prevents “horizontal enforcement”).
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that moral sanctions are a necessary substitute for legal sanctions
“because international law instruments like the [UDHR] have no
teeth.”67 According to this line of thinking, we are reduced to
supporting human rights in moral terms because the legal structure is
insufficient.
While the lack of reliable legal sanction against violators indeed
complicates efforts to vindicate the rights outlined in the UDHR, the
reliance on moral arguments in the human rights context should not
be viewed as a poor substitute for legal enforcement. Grounding
human rights in the language of moral duty has promoted a widelyheld view of human rights commitments as something more
powerful, even inspiring, than legal obligation. It has fostered the
growth of an international community founded on the idea of our
shared responsibility for each others’ well-being. As noted by
Professor Louis Henkin, human rights norms have gained a jus
cogens-like status that “is not the result of practice but the product of
common consensus from which few dare dissent.”68

III. THE INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION TO PROTECT
The widespread acceptance of the international community’s
moral obligation to individuals has led to a recent “sophisticated
attempt at establishing a moral guideline for international action in
the face of humanitarian emergency,”69 the emerging Responsibility
to Protect (“R2P”) norm. The concept was first introduced in late
2001 by a commission sponsored by the government of Canada, but
has quickly become part of the international discourse on
humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty.70 R2P is regularly
67. See Gopalan, supra note 60, at 820 (maintaining that sometimes the
offending state may not have ratified a legal instrument, making moral arguments a
necessity).
68. Henkin, Human Rights, supra note 47, at 39.
69. Graham Day & Christopher Freeman, Operationalising the Responsibility
to Protect – the Policekeeping Approach, 11 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 139, 139
(2005) (referring to the 2001 report of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty organized by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan).
70. See, e.g., International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, Special
Adviser with A Focus on the Responsibility to Protect, http://www.responsibilityto
protect.org/index.php/edward-luck-special-adviser-with-a-focus-on-theresponsibility-to-protect (last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (reporting that with the
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invoked by human rights advocates campaigning for international
action on ongoing mass atrocities like those currently occurring in
the eastern Congo and Darfur.71 The R2P provides a doctrinal basis
for the moral instinct that “a nation forfeits its right to sovereignty if
it unleashes or is unable to prevent massive human-rights abuses on
its soil.”72
The gradual process of operationalizing the R2P norm has
required the international community to reaffirm its commitment to
the principles outlined by the UDHR, and its emerging norm has also
had another, unlooked for, result. It has provided a paradigm, the
“individual responsibility to protect” for discussing individual
activism on human rights.73 Campaigns comprising individuals and
coalitions with large numbers of non-human rights professional
members are an increasingly prominent and effective part of the
human rights landscape. The success of these campaigns is
dependent on an understanding that individuals are morally obligated
to ensure the protection of human rights. This sense of an individual
moral obligation can be traced directly back to the UDHR’s
underlying philosophical premise that everyone bears the
responsibility of promoting universal respect for human rights.

support of the General Assembly, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has
appointed a Special Adviser focused on R2P, whose role is to develop conceptual
clarity and consensus for the evolving norm).
71. See Protecting the Vulnerable: What Congo Means for Obama,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 2008, at 55, available at http://www.economist.com/opinion
/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12601948 (arguing for intervention in the Congo and
noting that “the UN has accepted a responsibility to protect people in such cases”);
see also William G. O’Neill, The Responsibility to Protect Darfur, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Sept. 28, 2006, at 9, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0928/
p09s01-coop.html (arguing that under the responsibility to protect the United
Nations should send a peacekeeping force to Darfur, and further noting that the
Security Council does not need Sudan’s consent in order to do so).
72. Alex Perry, Why Congo’s Peacekeepers Are Coming Under Fire, TIME,
Oct. 28, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1854483,00.html.
73. See The Individual Responsibility to Protect, http://www.ir2p.org/home
(last visited Sept. 21, 2009) (“States have a responsibility to protect their own
populations from genocide and related crimes against humanity. Where they may
fail, all of us must do all we can to prevent disaster.”).
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A. THE MOVE TO R2P
Historically, international law upheld a strict rule against
intervention.74 However, there is increasing acceptance of the
proposition that states that do not comply with their human rights
obligations may not invoke the doctrine of nonintervention.75 In
conjunction with that proposition, it also appears that “the scope of
morally permissible humanitarian intervention [is] growing.”76
In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (“ICISS”) was established by the Government of
Canada in order to answer a question posed by then U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan: “[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a
Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of
human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”77
The ICISS responded with a new approach to humanitarian action:
the R2P. Describing the process, ICISS co-chair Gareth Evans said,
“The whole point is to develop an international reflex response that
goes, ‘Of course we have to do something. Let’s figure out what.’”78
The ICISS sought to recharacterize sovereignty as responsibility
rather than control, and noted a “transition from a culture of
sovereign impunity to a culture of national and international
accountability.”79 It stated that the practice of states and of the
74. See, e.g., Peter R. Baehr, “Humanitarian Intervention” A Misnomer?, in
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD: MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND POWER POLITICS 25 (Michael C. Davis et al. eds., M.E.
Sharpe 2004) (contrasting the general understanding of “aggression,” or
intervention into domestic matters, with the idea that protection of human rights
extends beyond the borders of any one state).
75. Id.
76. Steven P. Lee, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention, in
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS: MORAL ORDER IN A DIVIDED WORLD 152 (David A.
Ready et al. eds., Rowman & Littlefield 2005) (reasoning that respect for national
sovereignty can fluctuate based on changing circumstances, especially when
humanitarian intervention is authorized by the United Nations).
77. U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL KOFI ANNAN, MILLENIUM REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY GENERAL, ‘WE THE PEOPLES:’ THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 48 (U.N. Dep’t of Public Info.2000); see also ICISS Report,
supra note 8, at 1 (citing the genocide in Rwanda as an example of a situation
where not intervening can be as controversial as intervening).
78. Perry, supra note 72.
79. See ICISS Report, supra note 8, § 2.18; see also id. § 2.20 (emphasizing
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Security Council demonstrated that a “basic consensus” existed that
the international community must take action where states do not
fulfill their duty to protect their citizens.80
The ICISS’s report closed with a strong moral appeal “to embrace
the idea of the responsibility to protect as a basic element in the code
of global citizenship, for states and peoples, in the 21st century.”81 It
concluded with reference to the principles elaborated in the UDHR:
Nothing has done more harm to our shared ideal that we are
all equal in worth and dignity, and that the earth is our
common home, than the inability of the community of states
to prevent genocide, massacre and ethnic cleansing. If we
believe that all human beings are equally entitled to be
protected from acts that shock the conscience of us all, then
we must match rhetoric with reality, principle with practice.
We cannot be content with reports and declarations. We must
be prepared to act. We won’t be able to live with ourselves if
we do not.82
At the 60th session of the U.N. General Assembly, 191 world
leaders unanimously endorsed the R2P. They agreed that:
Each individual [s]tate has the responsibility to protect its
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through
appropriate and necessary means. We accept that
responsibility and will act in accordance with it.83
This endorsement affirmed the belief of the U.N. member states
that mass humanitarian crises are everyone’s concern and bound the
member states to the proposition that: “The international community,
through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use
that national law should still prevail and international options should only arise
when national systems of justice cannot suffice).
80. Id. § 8.33 (remarking that there are two ways in which states can fail to
fulfill their obligations: either by choice, or by their inability to do so).
81. Id.
82. Id. § 8.34. See generally UDHR, supra note 2 (including rights such as
freedom and equality among fundamental human rights).
83. U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1*, ¶ 138 (Sept. 20, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 World
Summit Outcome].
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appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in
accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United
Nations, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”84
A few months later, Security Council resolution 1674, adopted on
April 28th, 2006, reiterated the international community’s
“responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”85 These
developments evince a belief on the part of the U.N. member states
that honoring their commitment to universal human rights requires
the elevation of the R2P from a vague normative commitment to a
full-fledged practical obligation.
Current U.N. Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon recently proposed a
three-pronged approach to implementing the R2P. Citing concerns
that states might misuse the R2P, the Secretary-General called for the
full development of strategies and mechanisms for operationalizing
the R2P in a January 12, 2009 report.86 The Secretary-General’s three
pillar strategy comprises (1) the state’s protection responsibilities,87
(2) international assistance and capacity-building, and (3) “timely
and decisive action” to save lives in the event of a failure of the first
two pillars.88 Although the Secretary-General’s report admits that it
does not offer a full vision of how to employ and enforce the R2P, it
represents a move toward turning the rhetoric behind the 2005 World
Summit Outcome into concrete action.89
84. Id. ¶ 139.
85. S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).
86. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General on
Implementing the responsibility to protect, delivered to the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) (specifically responding to the R2P as
discussed in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome).
87. Id. at 10 (asserting that the responsibility to protect belongs to the state in
the first instance, “because prevention begins at home and the protection of
populations is a defining attribute of sovereignty and statehood in the twenty-first
century”).
88. Id. at 2; see also U.N. News Service, Ban calls for three-pronged strategy
to implement ‘responsibility to protect,’ (Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.un.org/apps/
news/story.asp?NewsID=29732&Cr=protect&Cr1=peace.
89. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, supra note 86, ¶ 67 (emphasizing
that, rather than attempting to renegotiate the wording of paragraphs 138 and 139
of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, it would be more beneficial to focus on
finding ways to implement the policy contained within them).
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Some commentators point out that the “uncertainty surrounding
the consequences of noncompliance” by the international community
may “shed doubt on the notion that the R2P was meant to be an
emerging hard norm of international law.”90 However, this
uncertainty about the possibility of legal enforcement has not
stopped the concept from inserting itself into the dialogue
surrounding international human rights.91 Although attempts to move
beyond rhetoric and to actually invoke the R2P have so far met with
limited success,92 supporters hope that the power of the norm to
capture the imagination will generate a groundswell of support for
the idea that the international community is morally obligated to
intervene in cases of extreme humanitarian crisis. In the words of
former U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes Issues, David Scheffer:
If we can reach the point where school children and their
parents exclaim, “R2P Ends Atrocity Crimes,” and
policymakers ultimately comprehend this siren call of their
peoples stamped on bumper stickers and broadcast through
enlightened corporate sponsors, then we will know that the
responsibility to protect has a fighting chance of diminishing,
perhaps even ending, atrocity crimes in our own time, on our
watch, and within our moral universe.93

B. INDIVIDUAL ACTIVISM AND GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP
Today, some of the most vigorous campaigning for state
compliance with human rights obligations is done by private
individuals and coalitions of individual activists. Amnesty
International is an early example of the involvement of non-

90. See Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or
Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 118 (2007) (implying that with a
lack of strict enforcement mechanisms, responsibility to protect may have been
intended simply as “soft law or a political principle”).
91. See David Scheffer, Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility to Protect,
40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 111, 111 (2007) (stating further that “it has invited
both praise and skepticism”).
92. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006)
(expanding the mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Darfur, and
authorizing the United Nations Mission in Sudan to “use all necessary means” to
protect the civilian population).
93. Scheffer, supra note 91, at 135.
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professional activists in the effort to enforce international human
rights law.94 In the words of Harold Koh, Legal Advisor for the U.S.
State Department:
International human rights law is enforced, I would say, not
just by nation-states, not just by government officials, not just
by world historical figures, but by people like us, by people
with the courage and commitment to bring international
human rights law home through a transnational legal process
of interaction, interpretation, and internalization.95
Especially on issues where mass atrocity is involved, Koh’s
“people like us” are often the loudest voices calling for an end to the
violence and respect for human rights. Movements like the Save
Darfur coalition, which comprise a huge network of individual
activists in addition to NGOs, are at the vanguard of the campaign to
end ongoing mass atrocities and ensure protection of human rights.96
It appeals to potential members’ sense of moral outrage and offers
individuals the opportunity to “help end the genocide by taking small
steps that can make a big difference for the people of Darfur.”97 One
of its most visible efforts has been the Global Days for Darfur;
during the second Global Day, participants gathered outside of
Sudanese embassies worldwide and blew rape whistles and set off
alarms to draw attention to issue of sexual violence in Darfur.98
These rallies along with massive letter writing campaigns and teachins represent a commitment to the idea that individual moral choices

94. See JOYCE, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that in the late 1970s “Amnesty
International has mobilized its 100,000 members in professional, religious and
local groups in fifty countries in the battle against torture”).
95. Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?,
74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1417 (1999).
96. See generally Save Darfur, http://savedarfur.org (last visited Sept. 21,
2009) (stating that the coalition’s purpose is to “utilize media outreach, public
education, targeted coalition building and grassroots mobilization to pressure
policymakers and other decision-makers in the United States and abroad to help
the people of Darfur”).
97. See Save Darfur, Take Action, http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/take
_action (last visited Sept. 21, 2009) (giving examples like lobbying a member of
Congress, planning local events and educating others).
98. See Save Darfur, About Us, http://savedarfur.org/pages/global_campaigns/
(last visited Sept. 21, 2009).
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can have a big impact in combating ongoing atrocities around the
world.
Similarly, the Genocide Intervention network invites potential
members to “mak[e] a powerful statement to our political leaders that
there is a large and committed group of citizens who are concerned
about ending and preventing genocide.”99 STAND, the student wing
of the Genocide Intervention Network, “is devoted to creating a
sustainable student network that actively fights genocide wherever it
may occur.”100 These network creation efforts are dependent on
mobilizing moral outrage and a shared belief that individuals have a
moral duty to take action to help others, even if their efforts
ultimately do not have much impact on the lives of those they are
trying to help.
College students have been particularly quick to adopt the moral
rhetoric of an individual responsibility to act and have been an
extremely vocal constituency in the fight against genocide. On its
website, STAND notes that the anti-genocide effort “has been called
the fastest-growing student movement in the world today.101 STAND
itself has over 850 chapters at schools worldwide.102 Additionally,
social networking websites indicate evidence of numerous groups
dedicated to raising awareness of and fighting genocide.103
These organizations that rely upon exhortations to, for example,
“Act Now to Protect Civilians in Eastern Congo”104 share a basic
99. Genocide Intervention Network, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.genocideintervention.net/network/faq (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
100. STAND,
http://www.standnow.org/about;
see
also
STAND,
http://www.standnow.org/about/who (last visited Oct. 30, 2009) (noting that
STAND was originally called “S.T.A.N.D.: Students Taking Action Now Darfur!”
and later changed its name to “STAND, the student-led division of the Genocide
Intervention Network” in order “to reflect STAND’s broadened focus on multiple
conflicts and new partnership” with the Genocide Intervention Network).
101. STAND, http://www.standnow.org/about/success (last visited Sept. 21,
2009).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Facebook, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2009)
(returning a list of over 500 groups in a search for “genocide”).
104. See STAND Act Now to Protect Civilians in Eastern Congo!,
http://www.standnow.org/blog/act-now-protect-civilians-eastern-congo (claiming
that advertisements in major European newspapers prompted the UK government
to change its position in favor of sending troops to the Democratic Republic of
Congo).
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premise that we, as individuals, are responsible for each other. A new
initiative called the Individual Responsibility to Protect (“iR2P”)
makes this assumption explicit. It asks individuals to sign a pledge
beginning “I believe I have an individual ‘responsibility to protect’”
and to “avow[] to use whatever influence is at their disposal to help
save lives wherever and whenever communities are at risk of mass
atrocities.”105 This commitment echoes the language of the UDHR
requiring “every individual” to work “to promote respect for these
rights and freedoms” and “to secure their universal and effective
recognition and observance.”106
This emerging iR2P norm owes its existence partially to the fact
that the combination of international political realities and absence of
strong legal enforcement of human rights means that, all too often,
states can get away with shirking their obligations to comply with
international human rights law. Consequently, in the words of John
Prendergast,107 “what we need, all over this country, is people who
are willing to stand up and make noise whenever there is a situation
that demands the United States[‘] attention and our action.”108 In this
way, an individual ethic of responsibility has arisen at least in part in
order to fill the gap left by states.
But although this ethic of responsibility plays a utilitarian role, its
origins are more complex than simply filling a compliance gap. The
emergence of the iR2P norm is directly traceable to the UDHR.
James Avery Joyce makes the point that the “sweeping” language of
the UDHR “leaves nobody any excuse to think that responsibility for
observing its terms is a job to be left to someone else.”109 The
drafters’ intention was to make clear that states could not escape
their responsibility to protect and promote human rights, but their
paradigm-shifting call for accountability has resulted in a move from
a world order in which a state’s treatment of its citizens was
considered nobody’s business to a shared belief that we are all
105. The Individual Responsibility to Protect, http://www.ir2p.org/pledge/.
106. UDHR, supra note 2, pmbl.
107. See Enough, About Us, http://www.enoughproject.org/about (describing
John Prendergast as an Africa expert and co-founder of Enough, which works “to
build a permanent constituency to prevent genocide and crimes against
humanity”).
108. STAND, Testimonials, http://www.standnow.org/testimonials.
109. JOYCE, supra note 3, at 51. See generally UDHR, supra note 2, pmbl.
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individually responsible for preventing suffering, wherever it may
occur.

CONCLUSION
The UDHR’s affirmation of “the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family”110 was
drafted as a direct moral response to the evils of Nazi Germany.111
That its preamble noted that “disregard and contempt for human
rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the
conscience of mankind”112 indicates the pressing need the drafters
felt to “come to an agreement about a universal moral code.”113
The contemporary normative impact of this “moral consensus
about human rights”114 is profound. Despite the increasing legal
entrenchment of the international human rights regime, the effort to
police compliance with human rights remains a fundamentally moral
enterprise. Although this occurred in part because of the delays to
legalization caused by Cold War politics and the resistance to
applying legal sanctions to violators arising out of state sovereignty,
it also owes a great deal to the enduring power of the UDHR’s call
for moral responsibility.
The UDHR’s fundamental premise that all members of the
international community share the responsibility for ensuring the
universal protection of human rights underlies current efforts to
operationalize the emerging Responsibility to Protect norm. The
spirit of the UDHR can be seen even more clearly in the increasing
numbers of individual activists campaigning for an end to mass
atrocities out of a sense of moral responsibility for the fates of far
away victims whom they will never meet. This concept of an
individual Responsibility to Protect bears out Elie Wiesel’s statement
that: “The defense of human rights has, in the last fifty years, become

110. UDHR, supra note 2, pmbl.
111. See MORSINK, supra note 19, at 37 (describing the process of selecting
certain articles for inclusion and arguing that “the motif that runs throughout these
adoptions and rejections is that the [UDHR] was adopted to avoid another
Holocaust or similar abomination”).
112. UDHR, supra note 2, pmbl.
113. MORSINK, supra note 19, at 36.
114. Id.
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a kind of worldwide secular religion.”115 It demonstrates that the
UDHR’s strong moral call to shared responsibility was ultimately
powerful enough to reach beyond its intended recipients in state
houses and parliaments, and to be heard by ordinary citizens around
the world.

115. Elie Wiesel, Voices: A Tribute to Human Rights, in THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FIFTY YEARS AND BEYOND 3 (Yael Danieli et.
al. eds., Baywood Publ’g Co. 1999).

